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Accessing Justice Amid Threats of 
Contagion
JANET E MOSHER*
* This article derives from two research projects on pandemic planning and homelessness in 
which I was a co-investigator (principal investigator, Professor Stephen Gaetz). The two 
projects, Responding to H1N1 in the Context of Homelessness in Canada and Understanding 
Pandemic Preparedness within the Context of the Canadian Homelessness Crisis, involved several 
academics, and included interviews and surveys of people experiencing homelessness, as 
well as service providers and public health officials in four Canadian cities. In this article I 
draw upon the data derived from the Toronto component of the projects. The funding for 
these research projects from the Canadian Institute for Health Research (CIHR) is gratefully 
acknowledged. An earlier version of this article was originally presented at the Symposium in 
Honour of John McCamus: Scholarship, Teaching and Leadership (7 February 2013), hosted 
at Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, Toronto.
Plans to prepare for a global pandemic have proliferated in recent years, and “legal 
preparedness” has emerged as a critical component of such plans. Commonly, the threat 
of disease is analogized to terrorism and recast as an issue of national security. In this 
framing, laws authorizing surveillance, containment, and forced treatment are understood 
as necessary. Law’s promise of protection against abuses in the exercise of such powers 
through procedural rights of review offers meagre comfort for critics concerned that 
individual liberties will readily yield to national security and public health in the context of 
an actual pandemic. An alternative framing shifts the focus to marginalized populations and 
existing disparities that account for the markedly disparate impacts of disasters. In shifting 
the frame, a broader conceptualization of law’s role emerges, one in which the redistribution 
of the burden of pandemics and access to the social determinants of health become central.
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question de sécurité nationale. Dans ce contexte, on met rarement en doute la nécessité 
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WHILE PLANS FOR THE CONTAINMENT AND CONTROL of new and potentially 
deadly pathogens have long existed, pandemic planning and preparedness efforts 
proliferated rapidly after the outbreak of SARS (severe acute respiratory syndrome) 
in 2003, the emergence of the looming threat of H5N1 (avian influenza), and 
the declaration by the World Health Organization of an H1N1 (swine flu) 
pandemic in 2009. The projection of 62 million deaths and devastating economic 
consequences arising from the next influenza pandemic is frequently cited.1 
Importantly, plans to respond to the worrisome possibility of a global influenza 
pandemic have been developed in an environment significantly influenced by 
the events of 9/11 and subsequent anthrax attacks in the United States. “Legal 
preparedness,” understood as the enactment of the necessary constellation 
of law and legal authority, has emerged as a critical component of pandemic 
preparedness. Yet, this description invites the question of precisely what laws are 
1. Editorial, “Swine Influenza: how much of a global threat” (2009) 373:9674 The Lancet 
1495 (citing Christopher Murray and colleagues who used data from the 1918-20 Spanish 
influenza pandemic as the basis for this prediction). Others predict that the number of deaths 
globally will be as high as 369 million. See Lawrence O Gostin & Benjamin E Berkman, 
“Pandemic Influenza: Ethics, Law, and the Public’s Health” (2007) 59:1 Admin L Rev 121 at 
125.
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
de protection qu’offre la loi contre les abus dans l’exercice de ces pouvoirs, par le biais du 
droit de recours en révision des procédés, offre peu de réconfort aux critiques qui redoutent 
que les libertés individuelles ne cèdent le pas aux intérêts de la sécurité nationale et de la 
santé publique advenant une véritable pandémie. Un changement de contexte réoriente les 
projecteurs vers des populations marginalisées et les disparités actuelles qui expliquent 
les effets fort disparates des désastres. Ce déplacement des projecteurs fait apparaître une 
plus vaste conceptualisation du rôle de la loi, dans laquelle une redistribution du fardeau des 
pandémies et l’accès aux déterminants sociaux de la santé prennent le haut du pavé.
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indeed necessary—a question that can only be answered by interrogating more 
closely how the threat is conceptualized and who is understood to be threatened.
Pervasive in the pandemic planning literature is an analogy between 
contagious disease and terrorism; between the individual carrier of disease and 
the terrorist intent on destruction. Both are depicted as threats to national 
security, and best managed through surveillance, borders, containment, and 
control.2 Given the stark threat posed by contagious disease in the context of an 
environment depicted as increasingly risky, the role of law is first and foremost to 
confer sufficient legal authority upon public health officials (aided by police where 
necessary) to engage in surveillance, apprehend and detain carriers or suspected 
carriers of disease (that is, to quarantine or isolate), and compel treatment. While 
not criminal law per se (although certainly some commentators have argued for 
the expansion of criminal law powers to respond to pandemics),3 this approach 
shares many features of the law-and-order framework that has dominated 
neo-liberal governance. The approach positions public health in opposition to 
individual rights to privacy, liberty, and security of the person, and accepts that 
infringement of the latter is justified to secure the former. In keeping with other 
laws enacted in the name of national security, the curtailment of the rights of 
some promises safety and security for others.4
As one might anticipate, this approach to pandemic planning has evoked 
critical responses from civil libertarians, who rightly worry that in a climate of 
fear and where national security is understood to be threatened, the curtailment 
of individual liberties will almost invariably be seen as justified.5 Assurances that 
voluntary compliance and individual responsibility will be widespread, that 
2. Wendy Mariner, George Annas, and Wendy E Parmet draw upon Priscilla Wald’s work in 
their description of this response as an “outbreak narrative.” People with contagious diseases 
are characterized as a threat to society, and the threat is countered by giving scientists control, 
which includes the authority to monitor and manage people, and requires people to obey 
strict regimens of isolation or treatment. See Wendy K Mariner, George J Annas & Wendy E 
Parmet, “Pandemic Preparedness: A Return to the Rule of Law” (2009) 1:2 Drexel L Rev 341 
at 359 [Mariner, Annas & Parmet, “Rule of Law”], citing Priscilla Wald, Contagious: Cultures, 
Carriers and the Outbreak of Narrative (Durham NC: Duke University, 2008).
3. See e.g. Amir Attaran & Kumanan Wilson, “A Legal and Epidemiological Justification for 
Federal Authority in Public Health Emergencies” (2007) 52:2 McGill LJ 381.
4. Stephen J Toope, “Fallout from ‘9-11’: Will a Security Culture Undermine Human Rights?” 
(2002) 65:2 Sask L Rev 281.
5. See e.g. George J Annas, Wendy K Mariner & Wendy E Parmet, Pandemic Preparedness: The 
Need for a Public Health – Not a Law Enforcement/National Security – Approach (American 
Civil Liberties Union, 2008), online: <http://www.aclu.org/pdfs/privacy/pemic_report.pdf> 
[Annas, Mariner & Parmet, Public Health].
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compulsion will be rare and invoked only when necessary, and that procedural 
rights of review will guard against abuses of power, for reasons elaborated below 
in Part I.C, do little to placate these worries.
Yet, a more fundamental critique of the conceptualization of pandemics as 
national security threats directs attention to the question of who, precisely, is 
the subject of the promised safety and security. Critical purchase on this issue is 
grounded in the lived realities of those persons and groups who experience social 
marginalization.6 In what follows I turn to the experiences of persons who are 
homeless in order to delineate the differential and harmful impact of approaching 
pandemics as a matter of national security.7 To develop this analysis I draw from 
accounts of past pandemics and disasters as well as from recent empirical research 
into the experiences of homeless individuals in Toronto during the H1N1 
pandemic, including their access to information about the pandemic, to vaccines, 
and to trusted medical personnel. With limited ability to stockpile resources, 
self-quarantine, or follow public health advice on preventative measures such as 
hand washing, those who are homeless are among the least likely to be in a position 
to comply voluntarily with public health edicts. This reality renders the homeless 
particularly vulnerable to coercive state action, especially when considered 
together with the possibility that the stereotyping and social stigmatization of 
homeless people may mark them as vectors of disease. Moreover, there is good 
reason to conjecture that procedures for judicial review of coercive state action 
will be of limited assistance to most people in the context of an actual pandemic, 
and of virtually no assistance to the homeless. The law-and-order/containment 
approach arguably promises more harm than good for those who are homeless.
6. I use “marginalization” in the sense articulated by Iris Marion Young to capture the social 
processes that exclude members of particular social groups from, or limit their participation 
in, economic, political and social spheres. Processes of marginalization result not only in 
material deprivation but, as Young argues, deprivation of the rights and freedoms others 
enjoy, the denial of opportunities to develop and exercise capacities, and the erosion of 
dignity. See Iris Marion Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1990) at 53-55.
7. There is currently no accepted pan-Canadian definition of homelessness. The Canadian 
Homelessness Research Network (CHRN) has developed a useful definition and topology 
that importantly moves beyond only those who are visibly homeless on the streets or 
utilizing emergency shelters. A broader definition is particularly important to capture 
women’s homelessness; given the violence women face on the streets and concerns to 
retain custody of their children, women’s homelessness is far less visible than men’s. For the 
CHRN’s definition, see Canadian Homelessness Research Network, “Canadian Definition 
of Homelessness” The Homeless Hub, online: <http://www.homelesshub.ca/sites/default/
files/06122012CHRNhomelessdefinition.pdf>.
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Attention to marginalized populations exposes additional flaws in the 
pandemics-as-national-security frame, and suggests an alternative approach 
grounded in principles of social justice. Shifting the focus from abstracted, 
undifferentiated individuals to marginalized individuals and groups makes 
it abundantly clear that social, economic, and geographic position matters 
enormously in the distribution of the burdens of pandemics and of the benefits of 
medical and non-medical countermeasures. It exposes the reality that those who 
are most socially vulnerable are likely to bear the greatest burdens of a pandemic. 
The homeless, given already compromised health and living conditions conducive 
to the spread of disease (for example, over-crowding, poor ventilation, and limited 
access to running water), are at greater risk of acquiring a communicable disease.8 
They have the fewest resources to protect themselves (including access to housing, 
food, information, and health care), and little capacity to shoulder the social and 
economic impact of measures such as quarantine. Countless historical (and indeed 
contemporary) examples demonstrate that pandemics are not equal opportunity 
events. Social vulnerability increases the likelihood of disease acquisition, reduces 
access to both medical and non-medical forms of remediation, and tightens the 
grip of morbidity and mortality. In virtually all forms of disasters and emergencies, 
marginalized groups, both globally and domestically, bear the largest burden, yet 
they continue to be routinely overlooked in pandemic plans.9 Unless attention 
is paid to social vulnerability in pandemic planning, such plans are likely to not 
only replicate, but exacerbate, existing inequality and deepen social injustices. 
The national security frame positions the “nation” as under threat, obscuring the 
reality that the likelihood and severity of the threat materializing depends very 
much on one’s social location.
Approaching pandemic planning with those who experience social 
marginalization clearly in view also prompts a shift in temporal focus. The national 
8. Cheryl S Leung et al, “Homelessness and the Response to Emerging Infectious Disease 
Outbreaks: Lessons From SARS” (2008) 85:3 J Urban Health 402.
9. While not a pandemic, the current outbreak of the Ebola virus in West Africa makes 
clear the critical role inequality plays not only in the acquisition and spread of disease, 
but in explaining the little attention Ebola has garnered since its first outbreak in 1976. 
Ebola is spread through close contact with the blood or body fluids of an infected person. 
Inadequate infection control in rural hospitals, and more broadly an under-resourced 
health care infrastructure, have been blamed, in part, for the spread of the disease; see Ian 
Kerridge & Lyn Gilbert, “Epidemic ethics: four lessons from the current Ebola outbreak” 
The Conversation (24 August 2014), online: < http://theconversation.com/epidemic-ethics-
four-lessons-from-the-current-ebola-outbreak-30534>; Lawrence O Gostin, Daniel Lucey & 
Alexandra Phelan, “The Ebola Epidemic: A Global Health Emergency” (2014) 312:11 JAMA 
1095 at 1095-96.
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security approach to pandemic planning is temporally concentrated upon the 
moment of crisis—that is, upon the containment and treatment of those exposed 
to disease. Here too, foregrounding the needs and experiences of the homeless 
exposes the limitations of this gaze. Rather the gaze must be expanded outwards 
to the pre-crisis period—to the long haul—and to the necessity of building trust, 
and the capacity to fulfil the social determinants of health.
Finally, an approach to pandemic planning that takes the needs and 
experiences of socially marginalized populations seriously prompts us to think 
anew about the nature of the rights at stake, the ethical values that ought to guide 
decision-making, and our choices about the role of law. Without a doubt, rights 
to privacy, liberty, and security of the person (usually defined in negative terms, 
as limits on the state) are implicated by current approaches. But consideration 
of the needs and experiences of marginalized populations suggests that a positive 
conception of rights—for example, of the right to health—might serve us all 
much better in preparing for and responding to a pandemic. It also stresses 
engagement with law’s role in furthering a substantive vision of social justice. 
It moves us beyond procedural justice—that is, beyond rights of review to test 
the balancing of individual rights and public health—and indeed beyond the 
coercive power of law. It moves our attention from national security to the role of 
law in securing social justice.
I. PANDEMICS AS A NATIONAL SECURITY THREAT
Many commentators have documented the emergence of a new paradigm in 
which public health emergencies and public health policy more broadly are 
filtered through “the prism of national security and law enforcement.”10 A prism 
of precisely this sort is found in Canada’s 2004 National Security Policy, the 
Executive Summary of which cautions:
10. Annas, Mariner & Parmet, Public Health, supra note 5 at 5. They also note that “President 
Bush’s first suggestion to contain a bird flu pandemic was to call in the military to quarantine 
large sections of the United States” (ibid at 8). Gostin and Berkman describe how, in the 
United States, H5N1 was regarded by policy makers as a threat to national security (supra 
note 1 at 123). Benjamin and Mouton suggest that “public health emergencies are now 
seen under the intense spotlight of national security concerns.” See Georges C Benjamin & 
Anthony D Moulton, “Public Health Legal Preparedness: A Framework for Action” (2008) 
36:1 JL Med & Ethics 13 at 13 [Benjamin & Moulton, “Public Health”]. Selgelid references 
the World Health Organization’s description of pandemic influenza as “the most feared 
security threat.” See MJ Selgelid, “Pandethics” (2009) 123:3 Pub Health 255 at 255.
MOSHER, ACCESSING JUSTICE AMID THREATS OF CONTAGION 925
But as all Canadians know, we live in an increasingly interconnected, complex 
and often dangerous world. The increase in terrorist acts and the threat of rapid, 
globalized spread of infectious disease all challenge our society and the sense of 
security that is so critical to our quality of life. Canadians understand this new 
reality.11
The Policy continues:
Terrorism is a global challenge that has been recognized by the United Nations as a 
crime against humanity. Canada is not immune to this threat.
But the threats we face are not limited to terrorism. The SARS (severe acute respiratory 
syndrome) outbreak demonstrated the power of individuals to unintentionally 
transmit threats around the globe at the speed of air travel.
The Government is determined to pursue our national security interests and to 
be relentless in the protection of our sovereignty and our society in the face of 
these new threats.12
…
The world is a dangerous place, even if the relative safety of life in Canada 
sometimes obscures just how dangerous it is. As recent events have highlighted, 
there is a wide range of threats facing Canada from pandemics to terrorism. These 
threats can have a serious impact on the safety of Canadians and on the effective 
functioning of our society.13
The Policy renders the risky and threatening environment as taken for 
granted, a matter of common sense, and cautions the reader not to be lulled into 
11. Government of Canada, Securing an Open Society: Canada’s National Security Policy (Privy 
Council Office, 2004) at vii, online: <http://www.pco-bcp.gc.ca/docs/information/
publications/aarchives/natsec-secnat/natsec-secnat-eng.pdf> [Government of Canada, Open 
Society].
12. Ibid at 1. The various threats identified are terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of 
mass destruction, failing states, foreign espionage, natural disasters, critical infrastructure 
vulnerability, organized crime, and pandemics. In Chapter 5, which addresses public health, 
the context is described as follows:
A robust public health system is a critical line of defence in protecting Canadians against 
many current and emerging threats, including contamination of our food and water, major 
disease outbreaks such as SARS, natural disasters, major accidents like chemical spills, and 
even the terrorist threat of a chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear attack. The complex, 
multijurisdictional nature of such threats also speaks to the necessity for Canada’s approach 
to public health emergencies to be more than strictly local or national in its orientation, 
and to proactively contribute to the building of a more resilient international public health 
architecture.
Ibid at 29.
13. Ibid at 6.
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complacency by the relative safety we may, in fact, temporarily experience. The 
Policy depicts the environment as equally risky for all. In their portrayal of that 
risky environment the authors of the Policy collapse acts of terrorism, failing 
states, foreign espionage, natural disasters, organized crime, critical infrastructure 
vulnerability, the proliferation of weapons, and pandemics into a singular 
“all-hazards approach,” and then locate these threats within a framework of 
national security.14 More broadly still, the Policy calls for the continuous inclusion 
of “the public health dimension in the ongoing national security debate.”15
While the physical borders of the nation state are certainly important in 
this account (one need think only of the airport surveillance of passengers’ body 
temperatures during the SARS crisis), the relevant borders are also internal. 
Quarantine and isolation—the power to construct internal borders to seal off 
and contain those infected or exposed to disease—have emerged as critical tools 
in the legal preparedness toolkit.16 Individuals carrying disease, or indeed even 
exposed to disease, can be apprehended, detained, and treated without consent. 
They are explicitly recast within Canada’s national security policy as threats to 
Canada’s sovereignty, and as persons against whom the state must act in order to 
secure the life, liberty, and security of Canadians.
This approach has been operationalized in a variety of ways, but significantly 
through the framework of legal preparedness. As the post-SARS Commission 
of Inquiry chaired by Justice Archie Campbell (the “Campbell Commission”) 
observed, legal preparedness has increasingly come to be viewed as a critical 
14. This all-hazards approach has been described and critiqued by a number of American and 
Canadian authors. For examples in the Canadian context, see Estair Van Wagner, “The 
practice of biosecurity in Canada: public health legal preparedness and Toronto’s SARS crisis” 
(2008) 40:7 Environment and Planning A 1647 at 1649. For examples in the American 
context, see Mariner, Annas & Parmet, “Rule of Law,” supra note 2; Brian Kamoie et al, 
“Assessing Laws and Legal Authorities for Public Health Emergency Legal Preparedness” 
(2008) 36:1 JL Med & Ethics 23. In this all-hazards approach “no matter what happens … 
a law enforcement/national security approach is required” (Canadian Homelessness Research 
Network, supra note 7 at 16).
15. Government of Canada, Open Society, supra note 11 at 29.
16. The terms quarantine and isolation are not used consistently in the cited literature. I use the 
terms in a manner consistent with the definitions offered by the World Health Organization: 
isolation is defined as “the separation, for the period of communicability, of infected persons”; 
quarantine as “the restriction of the movement of healthy persons who have been exposed to a 
suspected or confirmed case of infection with a highly communicable disease during the likely 
infectious period”; and social distancing to include “a range of community-based measures 
to reduce contact between people (e.g., closing schools or prohibiting large gatherings).” See 
the World Health Organization, Ethical considerations in developing a public health response to 
pandemic influenza (World Health Organization, 2007) at vi.
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component of public health preparedness.17 The definition of legal preparedness 
first developed in 2003 by Moulton et al as “the attainment by a public health 
system … of specified legal benchmarks or standards essential to the preparedness 
of that system”18 has been widely adopted, as has their elaboration of its four core 
elements.
1. The creation of laws and legal authorities conferring necessary 
powers on various levels of government and in particular, on public 
health officials;
2. Competency in using these laws effectively (competencies of public 
health professionals, among others, to know when and how to 
apply their legal powers);
3. The coordination of legally based interventions across jurisdictions 
(horizontally and vertically) and sectors; and
4. The sharing of information about public health laws and best 
practices.19
While in theory the concept of legal preparedness leaves open a multiplicity 
of possibilities for the sorts of laws one might argue are warranted to prepare 
for a pandemic, legal preparedness has generally been taken up in a manner in 
17. An independent Commission was established by the Government of Ontario to investigate 
the introduction and spread of SARS. Justice Archie Campbell of the Ontario Superior 
Court of Justice was appointed Commissioner. The Commission released three reports, 
totaling some 1500 pages and published in five volumes. Throughout this article, I focus 
on the Second Interim Report: SARS and Public Health Legislation. Government of Ontario, 
The SARS Commission, Second Interim Report: SARS and Public Health Legislation, Volume 
5 (Toronto: Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care, 2005) at 344, online <http://www.
archives.gov.on.ca/en/e_records/sars/report/index.html> [Campbell Commission].
18. Benjamin & Moulton, “Public Health,” supra note 10 at 14. See also AD Moulton et al, 
“What is Public Health Legal Preparedness?” (2003) 31:4 JL Med & Ethics 672 [Moulton 
et al, “Legal Preparedness”]; Demetrios L Kouzoukas, “Public Health Emergency Legal 
Preparedness: Legal Practitioner Perspectives” (2008) 36:1 JL Med & Ethics 18.
19. Benjamin & Moulton, “Public Health,” supra note 10 at 14. See also Moulton et al, “Legal 
Preparedness,” supra note 18; Kouzoukas, supra note 18.
(2014) 51 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL928
keeping with the national security account.20 In practice, what one sees is the call 
for—and in many jurisdictions the adoption of—legal frameworks that expand 
the ground for disease surveillance, the control of movement through quarantine, 
isolation, and other social distancing measures, and forced assessment and 
treatment.21 A brief overview of Ontario’s Health Protection and Promotion Act 
(HPPA) elucidates the nature of the powers granted to public health officials 
to control the movement and behaviours of persons infected, or assumed to be 
infected, with a communicable disease.22
A. ONTARIO’S LEGISLATIVE REGIME
Pursuant to subsection 22(1) of the HPPA, a Medical Officer of Health (MOH) 
may, by written order, “require a person to take or to refrain from taking any 
action that is specified in the order in respect of a communicable disease” 
(communicable diseases are identified by regulation).23 Section 22 orders, as they 
are known, may be issued if an MOH believes, upon reasonable and probable 
grounds,
a. that a communicable disease exists or may exist or that there is an 
immediate risk of an outbreak of a communicable disease in the 
health unit served by the medical officer of health;
20. Kouzoukas, supra note 18 at 18-19. Kouzoukas, Deputy General Counsel in the United 
States Department of Health and Human Services, identifies the first element as the 
“central, substantive aspect of public health legal preparedness” and notes that the need for 
additional federal laws in the United States to respond to the threats of bioterrorism and 
pandemics led to the passage of the Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness Act of 2006; the 
Public Readiness and Emergency Preparedness Act of 2006 and the Public Health Security and 
Bioterrorism Preparedness Response Act of 2002. Similarly, in the Canadian context, Attaran 
and Wilson make an argument for the need for a greater role of the federal government in 
the management of pandemics. In both Canada and the United States, issues of the scope of 
federal jurisdiction are debated. Attaran and Wilson suggest that the federal head of power 
under the Constitution in relation to quarantine has been read far too narrowly, limiting the 
role of the federal government solely to the regulation of national borders. They advance a 
further argument grounding increased federal jurisdiction in regulating pandemics within the 
federal criminal law power. See Attaran & Wilson, supra note 3.
21. Authority to detain and treat does not exhaust the role envisioned for law; jurisdictional 
clarity (within and between nations), surveillance, and patenting have also received attention 
within the national security framework.
22. RSO 1990, c H7 [HPPA].
23. Ibid, s 22(1). Boards of health in Ontario are municipally based and each has a medical 
officer of health.
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b. that the communicable disease presents a risk to the health of 
persons in the health unit served by the medical officer of health; 
and
c. that the requirements specified in the order are necessary in 
order to decrease or eliminate the risk to health presented by the 
communicable disease.24
Such orders may require, amongst other things, that a person who “has or 
may have a communicable disease or is or may be infected with an agent of a 
communicable disease” isolate himself or herself; submit to an examination by a 
physician; conduct himself or herself in such a manner as to not expose another 
person to infection; and where the disease is identified by regulation as virulent, 
place himself or herself under the care and treatment of a physician.25
A significant reform introduced in Ontario between the first and second 
wave of SARS cases in 2003 was the expansion of the power of a MOH to direct 
an order against a class of persons.26 The HPPA provides no definition of “class” 
and, consequently, a MOH retains broad powers to determine the contours of 
the class that constitutes the subject of the order. If notice to members of the class 
is likely to cause delay that “may significantly increase the risk to the health of 
any person,” notice may be given through “any communications media” deemed 
appropriate by a MOH, although the MOH must post the order at an address or 
addresses where it is most likely to be brought to the attention of the members 
of the class.27
A person who is the subject of a section 22 order is entitled to a hearing 
before the Health Services and Appeal Board established under the Ministry of 
Health and Long-Term Care Appeal and Review Boards Act, 1998.28 A request for 
a hearing must be made in writing within fifteen days of notice of the order, and 
the Board must hold a hearing within a further fifteen days. An appeal is available 
to the Divisional Court, from where yet another appeal is available by leave to 
the Court of Appeal. Although the Appeal Board may stay an order pending its 
decision, this is a matter of discretion.29
An entirely different procedural route exists should a MOH wish to take steps 
to enforce an order he or she has issued. The MOH must apply to the Ontario 
24. Ibid, s 22(2) [emphasis added].
25. Ibid, s 22(4).
26. Ibid, s 22(5.0.1).
27. Ibid, s 22(5.0.2), 22(5.0.3).
28. SO 1998, c 18, Schedule H.
29. HPPA, supra note 22, s 44.
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Court of Justice, seeking an order pursuant to section 35 requiring a person to 
isolate himself or herself, submit to an examination by a physician, place himself 
or herself under the care and treatment of a physician, and/or conduct himself 
or herself in a manner that avoids exposing other persons to infection.30 The 
coercive powers of the court include the potential to order that a person be taken 
into custody, admitted and detained in a hospital or “other appropriate facility,” 
(a provision added during SARS) and be examined and treated for a period of up 
to six months (which may be extended, on motion, for further periods, each of 
not greater than six months).31 A section 35 order may be directed to any police 
force in Ontario for enforcement.32 An appeal of a section 35 order to the Court 
of Appeal is restricted to questions of law alone and subject to a “special leave” 
requirement that the circumstances of the case are such that it is “essential in the 
public interest or for the due administration of justice that leave be granted.”33
B. JUSTIFYING LIMITS ON INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS
Significantly, section 22 and 35 orders override provisions of the Health Care 
Consent Act,34 which would otherwise require consent to an examination 
by a physician and to treatment.35 Needless to say, orders requiring isolation, 
submission to a medical examination without consent, or detention for 
treatment (again absent consent) reflect the exercise of extraordinary state 
powers. The circumstances in which infringements of rights may be justifiable in 
order to protect public health is a much debated issue. In the Canadian context, 
limitations on Charter protected rights, such as liberty and security of the person, 
are scrutinized under section 1 to determine whether they are reasonable and 
demonstrably justifiable in a free and democratic society.36 Without embarking 
on that analysis here, it is nevertheless important to note two sources that might 
usefully guide such an analysis in the context of a pandemic, the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the Siracusa Principles, a set 
30. Ibid, s 35(2).
31. Ibid, ss 35(3), 35(4), 35(5), 35(7), 35(11). Prior to SARS the HPPA referred only to 
hospitals.
32. HPPA, supra note 22, s 35(6). Prior to an amendment in 2007, the order was only 
enforceable by the police force in the health unit of the Ministry of Health.
33. Ibid, s 35(18), 35(19).
34. SO 1996, c 2, Schedule A.
35. HPPA, supra note 22, s 102(3).
36. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, s 1, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being 
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11. See e.g. Nola M Ries, “Quarantine 
and the Law: The 2003 SARS Experience in Canada (A New Disease Calls on Old Public 
Health Tools)” (2005) 43:2 Alta L Rev 529.
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of non-binding guides to the interpretation of the limitation clauses contained in 
the ICCPR.37 While no derogation is permitted of particular rights (for example, 
to life or to freedom from torture and slavery) the ICCPR contains both a 
general derogation clause related to public emergencies (Article 4) and specific 
provisions regarding limitations on specified rights in order to protect, among 
other interests, public health.38 Article 4 requires that the public emergency be of 
a nature that “threatens the life of the nation,” the emergency must be officially 
proclaimed, and the measures taken must be “strictly necessary” and must “not 
involve discrimination solely on the ground of race, colour, sex, language, religion 
or social origin.” In addition, a state taking such measures is obligated to inform 
other states parties to the Convention.
Informed by the interpretive guidelines provided by the Siracusa Principles, 
the derogation of rights guaranteed by the ICCPR in order to protect public 
health is commonly understood to require that restrictions be provided for and 
carried out in accordance with law, directed towards a legitimate objective of 
general interest, strictly necessary to achieve the objective, based on scientific 
evidence, the least intrusive or restrictive means available, neither arbitrary nor 
discriminatory, of limited duration, respectful of human dignity, and subject to 
review.39
37. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 16 December 1966, 999 UNTS 
171, Can TS 1976 No 47 6 ILM 368 [ICCPR]; UN Sub-Commission on Prevention of 
Discrimination and Protection of Minorities: Siracusa Principles on the Limitation and 
Derogation of Provisions in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, UNESC, 
41st Sess, Annex, Agenda Item 18, UN Doc E/CN4/1984/4 (1984). The Siracusa Principles 
were developed during a meeting of international experts in Siracusa, Italy in 1984 and 
subsequently adopted by the United Nations Economic and Social Council. Although 
a non-binding set of interpretive principles, they are widely referenced in the academic 
literature and in international jurisprudence. Note that Canada is a signatory to the 
Covenant.
38. Limitations of the rights to freedom of movement and to leave one’s country, to peaceful 
assembly, to association, and to manifest one’s freedom of religion and of conscience in order 
to protect public health are all recognized. While the provisions vary somewhat, common 
features are the requirement that such limitations be provided by law, are necessary in order 
to protect public health, and are consistent with other rights recognized by the Covenant. 
ICCPR, supra note 37 at arts 12, 18, 19, 21, 22.
39. WHO, “Ethical Considerations,” supra note 16 at 9. In the context of the current outbreak 
of the Ebola virus and the mass quarantine of the West Point slum in Liberia arguably 
none of these conditions have been satisfied. The quarantine, originally to last for 21 days, 
ended after 10 days of escalating protest, violence and food scarcity and likely did more to 
spread the virus than to contain it; see Mark A Rothstein, “From SARS to Ebola: Legal and 
Ethical Considerations for Modern Quarantine” (2015) 12:1 Indiana Health Law Review 
(forthcoming).
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More particularly, in the context of a pandemic, these principles require 
clear and convincing evidence that the person whose rights are to be curtailed is 
infected with a contagious disease (or at a minimum, is reasonably suspected of 
being infected) and poses a demonstrable threat to others; that the intervention 
is an effective means of combating the public health threat; that the burden is 
proportionate to the expected benefit; that the measure is the least restrictive of the 
options available; and that the measure is applied in a non-discriminatory manner.40
Difficult questions will no doubt arise in the application of these principles 
to an actual pandemic, particularly in the context of an emerging disease about 
which little is known. How effectiveness is understood and operationalized will be 
important. In relation to isolation and quarantine in particular, one might insist 
upon scientific evidence demonstrating that the disease is contagious and that 
isolation and/or quarantine stand a “reasonable scientific chance of substantially 
diminishing the spread of disease.”41 But as Bensimon and Upshur caution, the 
effectiveness of quarantine “depends as much on evidence from epidemiological 
studies as it does on explicitly identifying and addressing the preferences and 
cultural commitments of affected and involved communities.”42
The importance of considering the role of social, economic, and cultural 
factors in assessing the efficacy of quarantine and social distancing measures 
is underscored by the experience of SARS in Ontario. There is considerable 
post-SARS evidence of the tremendous challenges even relatively well-resourced 
people faced in maintaining quarantine. Reynolds et al surveyed some 1057 
people who had experienced quarantine in Toronto during SARS. Compliance 
with quarantine behaviours varied from 50.4 per cent (use of mask when other 
household members were present) to 99.4 per cent (did not go out of the house to 
40. Gostin & Berkman, supra note 1 at 146-48. The World Health Organization’s ethical 
guidelines on pandemic planning provide that “public health measures that involve 
significant costs and/or burdens should be reserved for situations where they can be 
reasonably expected to make a difference to the consequences of a pandemic.” WHO, 
“Ethical Considerations,” supra note 16 at 3.
41. See Cécile M Bensimon & Ross EG Upshur, “Evidence and Effectiveness in Decisionmaking 
for Quarantine” (2007) 97:1 Am J Pub Health S44 at S46.
42. Ibid at S47-S48.
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socialize).43 The proportion reporting compliance with all household protective 
measures was 38.4 per cent, and with all community protective measures 54.1 
per cent. Quarantine also came with costs, both financial (although the Ontario 
and federal governments later introduced financial compensation that partially 
addressed this issue) and health (symptoms of depression and posttraumatic stress 
disorder were commonly reported). The data on compliance led Reynolds et al 
to contemplate the need for the expansion of coercive measures to shore up the 
effectiveness of quarantine, including quarantine facilities, compliance hotlines, 
and the immediate issuance of legal orders.44 This suggestion for an escalation 
in measures of compliance enforcement is particularly troubling in light of the 
widely shared medical view that quarantine and isolation will be of limited utility 
in controlling the transmission of the flu virus.45 Escalating compliance measures 
are rendered all the more concerning by the possibility that, because quarantine 
creates the impression that the state is actively pursuing the public’s health, its use 
may be driven by its political, rather than scientific, value.46
But beyond this concern, assessments of what actions are necessary—and of 
what restrictions on various rights are justified—are substantially impacted by 
perceptions of risk, and these perceptions are often anything but evidence-based. 
43. DL Reynolds et al, “Understanding, compliance and psychological impact of the SARS 
quarantine experience” (2008) 136:7 Epidemiology & Infection 997. See also Laura 
Hawryluck et al, “SARS Control and Psychological Effects of Quarantine, Toronto, Canada” 
(2004) 10:7 Emerging Infectious Diseases 1206. The latter study involved a survey of 
129 persons quarantined in Toronto during SARS. As many as 50 per cent felt they had 
not received adequate information about infection control, and, as in the Reynolds study, 
compliance rates varied. As a further consideration, Ries notes the challenge of locating the 
contacts of those infected; of the twenty-three thousand people who were contacts of SARS 
patients, approximately nine thousand could not be reached or were only reached after the 
ten day quarantine period had passed. Ries, supra note 36 at 544.
44. Reynolds et al, supra note 43 at 1003-04. In Singapore and Hong Kong, measures to enforce 
compliance were much stronger and more coercive than in Toronto and included cordoning 
off buildings, electronic monitoring and the use of surveillance cameras.
45. Gostin & Berkman, supra note 1 at 171. In a recent editorial, Richard Schabas (Ontario’s 
chief medical officer of health from 1987-1997) and Neil Rua had this to say about 
quarantine: “Quarantine didn’t help control SARS and it won’t help control Ebola. Because 
of fear of Ebola, whole areas of West Africa are being cordoned off and airlines are cancelling 
services. These are forms of quarantine. They will hinder the flow of aid without stopping 
the disease’s spread.” Richard Schabas & Neil Rau, “Ebola: Can we learn from SARS?” The 
Globe and Mail (27 August 2014), online: < http://www.theglobeandmail.com/globe-debate/
ebola-can-we-learn-from-sars/article20211486/>.
46. Joshua P Garoon & Patrick S Duggan, “Discourses of disease, discourses of disadvantage: A 
critical analysis of National Pandemic Influenza Preparedness Plans” (2008) 67:7 Soc Sci & 
Med 1133 at 1136.
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As Parmet has argued, disease is not only biological, but social and political; as 
such, the level of fear may have little to do with actual lethality or incidence. 
She maintains that especially as contagious disease has become less common in 
developed countries, the fear of such diseases those of us living in such countries 
experience has increased.47 Pandemics, by definition, are global outbreaks 
caused by a strain of virus not already known to be circulating in the human 
population. The unknown quality of the virus (how it is transmitted, and its 
impact on morbidity and mortality), the absence of immunity in the population, 
and the unavailability of vaccines combine with anxieties related to global travel 
and trade to render pandemics particularly threatening in the Western public 
imagination. The intensity of this fear creates pressure for state action, which 
frequently takes the form of strong social controls and, occasionally, extreme 
measures. By contrast, Parmet points out, “common and deadly diseases, such as 
childhood diarrhea or cardiovascular disease, elicit little concern and frequently 
are met with neglect by state officials.”48
Sunstein offers important insights into our perception of risk, delineating 
two potential sources of error at play when public fear leads to support for the 
erosion of civil liberties. He calls one error the “availability heuristic” to capture 
the potential of salient incidents (i.e., incidents that stand out due to vivid imagery 
or recent occurrence) to generate an exaggerated sense of risk.49 If the harm is 
easily imagined, public demand for state action increases, leading to potentially 
excessive precautions. If not easily imagined, the risk may be neglected.50 He also 
points to the role of “availability entrepreneurs” who actively “drive public fear in 
their preferred directions.”51 The second error is “probability neglect,” where focus 
is directed to the worst-case scenario, regardless of how likely it is to happen.52
Sunstein and Parmet both identify the important role of the media in the 
construction of risk and fear. As Sunstein argues, “[m]any perceived “epidemics” 
47. Wendy E Parmet, “Public Health & Social Control: Implications for Human Rights,” 
The International Council on Human Rights Policy’s Project on Social Control and Human 
Rights Research Paper (2009) at 11, online: < http://www.ichrp.org/files/papers/173/
public_health_and_social_control_wendy_parmet.pdf> [Parmet, “Public Health & Social 
Control”].
48. Ibid. A similar point has been made about the Ebola virus: In the same time period that 
the Ebola virus is estimated to have caused 1,000 deaths, malaria is estimated to have killed 
300,000, and tuberculosis is estimated to have killed 600,000. See Kerridge and Gilbert, 
supra note 9.
49. Cass R Sunstein, “Fear and Liberty” (2004) 71:4 Soc Research 967 at 969.
50. Ibid at 970.
51. Ibid at 970.
52. Ibid at 971.
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are in reality no such thing, but instead a product of media coverage of gripping, 
unrepresentative incidents.”53 Indeed the whipping up of fear and of concerns 
about safety is a common technique of governance.54 The expanding reach of 
criminal law, the recent proliferation of mandatory minimum sentences, and the 
creation of quasi-criminal “safe streets” legislation and by-laws, for example, have 
all been justified by “claims-makers” or availability entrepreneurs as necessary 
for the safety and protection of the public (or more aptly, some members of 
the public).55 Claims of threats to safety, rather than empirical data, have 
propelled these reforms. With the production of fear comes increased demand for 
government action and the very real possibility of disproportionate responses and 
unnecessary curtailment of civil liberties.56 Fear, as Gagnon, Jacob, and Holmes 
maintain, is inherently political, invoked by the state as a tool of governance. They 
suggest that fear is invoked in public health campaigns (they examine campaigns 
regarding sexually transmitted diseases in particular) as a “strategy to create a state 
of permanent (in)security and manipulate people into becoming calculating, 
rational and self-interested subjects who avoid the perils of human desires and 
contagion.”57 In summary, there is good reason to think that assessments of the 
measures considered strictly necessary to protect public health may be driven 
more by fear and political expediency than by science.
Another set of questions concerns who will most likely be affected and 
how readily their rights, in particular, might be ignored. In the “preparedness” 
environment, responsibility is seen to rest with individuals, as well as governments, 
to adequately prepare for hazards of all sorts. Individuals are expected to stockpile 
food and other necessities, wash their hands, disinfect surfaces, and obtain 
seasonal vaccinations. Voluntary compliance with public health orders—be they 
for quarantine, isolation, school closures or a prohibition on social or religious 
53. Ibid at 976.
54. See Joe Hermer & Janet E Mosher, eds, Disorderly People: Law and the Politics of Exclusion in 
Ontario (Halifax: Fernwood, 2002); Patrick Parnaby, “Disaster through Dirty Windshields: 
Law, Order and Toronto Squeegee Kids” (2003) 28:3 Can J Sociology 281.
55. See Kent Roach, “Did September 11 Change Everything? Struggling to Preserve Canadian 
Values in the Face of Terrorism” (2002) 47:4 McGill LJ 893.
56. Sunstein, supra note 49 at 977.
57. Marilou Gagnon, Jean Daniel Jacob & Dave Holmes, “Governing through (in)security: A 
critical analysis of a fear-based public health campaign” (2010) 20:2 Critical Pub Health 245 
at 249.
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gatherings—is assumed to be a widely accepted norm and practice.58 As such, 
resort to coercion is understood to be exceptional and thus, infringements on 
rights rare. Moreover, given the emphasis on individual responsibility to prepare, 
avoid, and comply, those who fail to take these precautionary measures are faulted 
and blamed for their own neglect.59 Both the SARS and the H1N1 outbreaks 
made clear that those without resources, such as a home in which to isolate 
themselves, stockpiles of food, running water and soap for regular hand washing, 
or access to trusted medical personnel, are less able to protect themselves. Their 
ability to comply is structurally limited; they are unable, and presumptively not 
unwilling, to comply. But their lack of compliance renders them more vulnerable 
to the coercive arm of law.60
Volumes of historical evidence of pandemics tell us that those who are socially 
marginalized bear the greatest burden in terms of disease acquisition, death, 
58. See Public Health Agency of Canada, Canadian Pandemic Influenza Plan for the Health 
Sector, online: <http://www.phac-aspc.gc.ca/cpip-pclcpi/>. The plan emphasizes personal 
preparedness but does, in Annex O, detail a coordinating role for the Council of Emergency 
Social Services Directors in organizing volunteers, distributing food, and creating temporary 
shelters. The May 2009 editorial of The Lancet, issued in the midst of the H1N1, urges 
readiness to self-isolate at home if flu-like symptoms appear (Lancet, supra note 1). Ontario 
has produced a series of one page fact sheets about pandemic flu, these include: “Taking 
Care of Yourself and Your Family: What to Do If You Get Pandemic Flu” (stay home, rest, 
take a warm bath); “Preparing for a Pandemic Flu: Making Individual and Family Plans” 
(including a series of questions to consider, such as what to do if your child’s daycare closes, 
but provides no solutions); and “Staying Healthy During a Flu Pandemic” (the advice is to 
eat well, drink lots of water, exercise regularly, stay home, wash your hands often, stay away 
from people, and avoid public gatherings and crowds). Clearly, this advice presupposes access 
to considerable resources; the overwhelming majority of these recommendations are simply 
impossible for the homeless to implement. For fact sheets, see Ontario Ministry of Health 
and Long-Term Care, Ministry Programs, Influenza Pandemic, online: <http://www.health.
gov.on.ca/en/public/programs/emu/pan_flu/pan_flu_materials.aspx#fs>.
59. A 2007 New York Academy of Medicine study concluded that “planners are developing 
emergency instructions for people to follow without finding out whether it is actually possible 
for them to do so or whether the instructions are even the most protective action for certain 
groups of people to take.” Annas, Mariner & Parmet, Public Health, supra note 5 at 18. The 
study further notes that the administration’s preference for market-based health care leaves 
individuals to fend for themselves.
60. This is evident in the case of City of Newark v JS, 279 NJ Super 178, 652 A.2d 265 (1993) 
(holding that illness alone does not permit confinement, but that a homeless person suffering 
from active tuberculosis could be confined because other accommodations were insufficient).
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rights deprivations, and depletion of resources and assets.61 History also tells us, 
repeatedly, that marginalized social groups—the poor, immigrants, particular 
racialized groups—have been identified as vectors of disease, scapegoated, 
blamed, cordoned off, and banished. The inculcation of fear of the homeless 
and of squeegee workers used to justify Ontario’s Safe Streets Act,62 combined 
with the fear of contagion and the absence of resources to protect themselves, 
may render homeless people scapegoats during the next pandemic. These are 
the “foreigners”—the internal and external enemies63—who, as outlined in 
Canada’s National Security policy, pose a threat to national security and who 
must therefore be contained and neutralized. The willingness to curtail rights 
arises not only from flawed perceptions of risk, but as Toope reminds us, from an 
implicit assumption “that ‘we’ are giving up somebody else’s rights for a perceived 
improvement in our security.”64
C. THE PROMISE OF PROCEDURAL JUSTICE
As noted at the outset, in response to concern over the violation of individual rights 
in the name of public health (reinscribed as national security), the availability of 
judicial review of public health orders is proffered as a means to guard against 
61. See for example Felice Batlan, “Law in the Time of Cholera: Disease, State Power, and 
Quarantines Past and Future” (2007) 80:1 Temple L Rev 53. Mariner, Annas, and Parmet 
conclude that “[m]easures like quarantine, surveillance, and behavior control have historically 
been targeted at people who are already disadvantaged, those on the margins of society, 
especially immigrants, the poor, and people of color” (Mariner, Annas & Parmet, “Rule of 
Law,” supra note 2 at 358-59). Gostin & Berkman express concern that “governments would 
use social distancing in a discriminatory fashion, scapegoating ethnic or religious minorities, 
or using social distancing to pretextually crack down on dissidents who assemble to protest” 
(Gostin & Berkman, supra note 1 at 165). And Mariner, Annas & Parmet remind us that:
Highly discriminatory and forcible vaccination and quarantine measures adopted in 
response to outbreaks of the plague and smallpox over the past century have consistently 
accelerated rather than slowed the spread of disease, while fomenting public distrust and, 
in some cases, riots.
The lessons from history should be kept in mind whenever we are told by 
government officials that “tough,” liberty-limiting actions are needed to protect us from 
dangerous diseases.
Annas, Mariner & Parmet, Public Health, supra note 5 at 5-6.
62. SO 1999, c 8.
63. See also Rita Dhamoon & Yasmmen Abu-Laban “Dangerous (Internal) Foreigners and 
Nation-Building: The Case of Canada” (2009) 30:2 Int’l Pol Sci Rev 163.
64. Toope, supra note 4 at 295.
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abuses of power and to ensure the proper balance is struck between individual 
rights and “the right of the public to be protected against infectious disease.”65 
The Campbell Commission, in its Final Report, Spring of Fear, identified a host 
of “glaring deficiencies in Ontario’s health protection and emergency response 
laws.”66 Many of these glaring deficiencies relate to failings in procedural justice, 
where “confusion and uncertainty are the only common threads throughout the 
legal procedures now provided by the Health Protection and Promotion Act for 
public health enforcement and remedies.”67
For the person seeking to challenge a section 22 order, a fifteen day period 
to file a written notice, and a further fifteen day period during which the Board 
must hold a hearing, creates the absurd result that the time period of the original 
order may well have expired. For example, during the SARS period, quarantine 
was usually for a ten day period, so the period of containment and restricted 
mobility would in all likelihood have expired before an order was subject to 
review.68 The Campbell Commission also notes the further delay caused by an 
appeal to the Divisional Court, a leave application, and a further appeal to the 
Court of Appeal. As such, most rights violations—if subject to review at all—
will occur only after the period of isolation, quarantine, or treatment has been 
completed. The response of the Coalition of Muslim Organizations to Canada’s 
anti-terrorism legislation captures well the unsatisfactory nature of an ex post 
review:
65. Campbell Commission, supra note 17 at 335.
66. Government of Ontario, SARS Commission, Final Report: Volume 2, Spring of Fear (Toronto: 
Queen’s Printer, 2006) at 3, online: < http://www.health.gov.on.ca/en/common/ministry/
publications/reports/campbell06/campbell06.aspx>
67. Campbell Commission, supra note 17 at 9. In addition to the powers reviewed above there 
are separate powers to make orders and to enforce them for occupational and environmental 
hazards (HPPA, supra note 22, s 13) and where the Chief Minister of Health needs to act in 
the face of a health risk (ibid, s 86).
68. During the SARS period, between fifteen thousand to twenty thousand people with 
epidemiologic exposure to SARS were instructed to remain in “voluntary” quarantine, 
meaning they were to remain in their homes, avoid having visitors, wash their hands 
frequently, wear masks in the same room with other household members, avoid sharing 
personal items, sleep in separate rooms, and measure their temperature twice daily. Some 
health care workers were on “work quarantine” and permitted to travel only between their 
homes and the health care facilities where they were employed. In total, only twenty-seven 
section 22 orders were issued during the SARS period. While many characterize the 
quarantines during SARS as voluntary (apart from these few instances where orders were 
issued), others question this characterization given that non-compliance would lead quickly 
to the issuance of an order.
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The adverse impacts of this Bill [C36] will not be remedied by judicial oversight 
and post-facto vindication. Stern judicial sanctions of the State’s violation of rights 
make great case law …[ .] However, case law will not put together ruined families, 
regain lost livelihoods, or rebuild friendships and trust, which were fractured by 
the suspicion, innuendo, and stigmatization sown by the overly zealous acts of the 
State.69
Moreover, the restriction of appeals of section 35 orders to the Court of 
Appeal to questions of law alone, and then only with “special leave” is deeply 
troubling in light of the real possibility, canvassed above, that the evidentiary 
threshold for resorting to coercive measures may be driven more by fear and 
political expediency than by science.70
Further procedural challenges relate to the opportunity for those who 
are the subject of orders to participate in the processes for review. Given the 
short timeframes for action and the nature of the rights in issue—security of 
the person, autonomy, and liberty—and the complexity of the legal regime, it 
is hard to imagine effective participation without access to counsel. For those 
without resources to hire counsel, rapid access to state-funded legal counsel will 
be critical, but nowhere is this assured.
Moreover, a further quandary identified by the Campbell Commission in 
its work is that of respecting the participatory rights of those subject to orders, 
while simultaneously preventing the “court process from becoming a vector of 
infection.”71 The need to protect the health and safety of court staff may well 
require specific procedural modifications, such as the ability to conduct hearings 
via videoconference. A related, but broader, concern is the potential closing 
of courts; as a Florida bench guide concludes, “[i]f the courts fail to open or 
to function for any reason, the revered concept of ‘access to justice’ becomes 
meaningless. To ensure that access to justice is, in fact, a reality, it is essential 
to make sure that the courts have in place deliberately – designed strategies for 
addressing potential court-closing emergencies of all kinds.”72 But as the Florida 
bench guide and others have acknowledged, in the context of a serious pandemic, 
access to meaningful procedures may simply be non-existent.
69. Coalition of Muslim Organizations, “Brief to Standing Committee on Justice and Human 
Rights on Bill C-36” (8 November 2001), cited in Roach, supra note 55 at 913.
70. The Campbell Commission describes this as a restriction of access to justice of a person 
whose rights have been significantly infringed. Campbell Commission, supra note 17 at 332.
71. Ibid at 352.
72. Florida Court Education Council, Pandemic Influenza Benchguide: Legal Issues Concerning 
Quarantine and Isolation, 2007 ed, at 4, online: <http://www.flcourts.org/gen_public/
courted/bin/pandemic_benchguide.pdf>.
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The need for clarity and speed for all concerned leads the Campbell Commission 
to recommend the creation of a single, simple, codified, self-contained, and 
complete set of procedures in the Superior Court. As envisioned it would include 
special procedures, such as ex parte applications for interim and temporary orders, 
and video and audio hearings.73 Significantly, consistent with recommendations 
of the Commission, the HPPA has been amended to enhance the powers of 
Medical Officers of Health, to allow for the mandatory surrender of premises for 
use during an outbreak, to facilitate the sharing among state officials of personal 
health information, to obligate doctors and nurses to report a patient with a 
communicable disease who refuses or neglects to continue with treatment, and 
to expand the police services vested with powers to enforce section 35 orders, yet 
virtually none of the recommendations of the Commission for procedural reform 
has been adopted in Ontario.74 The legislative reforms implemented during the 
unfolding of the SARS outbreak—the expansion of places of detention beyond 
hospitals to include other “appropriate facilities,” and the ability to issue orders 
against a class—remained unchanged, notwithstanding the Commission’s 
recommendation that, with regard to class orders, the legislation be changed to 
require reasonable efforts be made to consult with the class prior to the issuance 
of an order.75
As such, we are left in Ontario with a regime in which a person—or indeed 
an entire class of persons—can be ordered detained and medically examined 
without consent, and required to take steps to avoid exposing other people to 
infection, including through quarantine. Beyond this, where the communicable 
disease is categorized as virulent, persons can be detained for treatment, absent 
consent, for six months at a time. Notwithstanding these significant infringements 
of rights to security of the person, liberty, and autonomy, the procedures to 
challenge such orders are woefully inadequate; they remain the “confusing maze 
of overlapping and uncertain judicial powers and procedures best described as a 
legal nightmare.”76
This brings us to what is perhaps the crux of the matter: where persons 
who either have or potentially have a communicable disease are cast as a threat 
to the public (rather than respected members of that public), and where fear 
is cultivated, the ‘necessary’ transgression of individual rights becomes all too 
73. The Campbell Commission also makes a broad range of additional recommendations 
regarding the HPPA that speak to employment protections and the conditions of detention, 
which I review in further detail below.
74. HPPA ss 26, 29.2, 35(6), 77.6, 77.9.
75. Ibid, ss 5.0.1-5.0.5, s 35(3).
76. Campbell Commission, supra note 17 at 337.
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readily accepted. Given the dominant narrative propelling this account, the 
outcome of the “delicate task of balancing individual rights against the right of 
the public to be protected against infectious disease”77 identified by the Campbell 
Commission, or the justifiable derogation of rights envisioned by the ICCPR 
and Siracusa Principles, may be already largely predetermined. Mariner, Annas, 
and Parmet identify the edict that we must “trade liberty for security”78 as the 
signature phrase—or we might say, the central moral lesson—of the national 
security approach to pandemic planning. The approach implores us to take for 
granted (or assume that “all Canadians know” and accept) the imperative to trade 
individual rights for national security.79 Fear is promoted and safety is promised in 
return; the violation of individual rights is a collateral, but necessary, outcome.80
While we could craft procedures that are more appropriate and responsive, 
provide timely notice and quick access to hearings, fund access to counsel, 
delineate clearer evidentiary standards, and undertake other measures to better 
safeguard individuals rights—steps the Campbell Commission suggests we 
should take—these measures are unlikely to make a substantial difference for 
marginalized groups or to the health of the population.81 Indeed, that the Ontario 
government has failed to act on the recommendations of the Commission for 
procedural reform is a disturbing signal that those whose rights will be at stake 
are not worthy of protection. Just as we ought to be skeptical of claims that 
national security is attained by limiting the rights of those suspected of terrorism, 
so too should we be skeptical of the claim that public health is protected by the 
limitation of the rights of those who have (or may have) acquired a communicable 
77. Ibid at 335.
78. Mariner, Annas & Parmet, “Rule of Law,” supra note 2 at 354. In the Canadian context 
Toope asserts that a culture of rights is being replaced by a culture of security (supra note 4 at 
283).
79. Annas, Mariner, and Parmet persuasively argue that “the notion that we must “trade 
liberty for security” is both false and dangerous”; false because “coercive actions are seldom 
conducive to public health protection” and dangerous “because it provides a never-ending 
justification for the suppression of civil liberties while failing to safeguard public health” 
(Annas, Mariner & Parmet, Public Health, supra note 5 at 8).
80. See George J Annas, “Puppy Love: Bioterrorism, Civil Rights, and Public Health” (2003) 
55:5 Fla L Rev 1171 at 1173. More pointedly Annas argues that the approach can be 
described as “scare them to death and then take power” (ibid at 1175).
81. Parmet expresses a similar concern about the limitations of judicial review and the inability 
of existing legal and ethical frameworks to secure human rights (Parmet, “Public Health & 
Social Control,” supra note 47). And many have expressed the broader worry that the culture 
of security threatens human rights. See e.g. Toope, supra note 4. Toope, however, is more 
optimistic about the potential of the courts.
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disease.82 Rather, a fundamental reorientation is required, one that moves beyond 
a narrow focus on individual autonomy, brings social context and marginalized 
populations fully into the foreground, and prioritizes public health preparedness.
II. SECURING PUBLIC HEALTH
Rather than accepting the catastrophic events of 9/11 as the backdrop and impetus 
for its framework, a consideration of past pandemics and the current social 
context is the starting point in this alternative conception. As noted briefly above 
in the Introduction and Part I.B, history reveals that the burdens of pandemics—
indeed of virtually all forms of disasters—have not been borne equally; those who 
are the most socially and economically disadvantaged have suffered the greatest 
burdens, their interests largely disregarded.83 Of the 62 million deaths projected 
for the next major influenza pandemic, it is estimated that 96 per cent will be in 
low- and middle-income areas (both nationally and globally).84 In Canada, the 
H1N1 pandemic in 2009 had a disproportionate impact on Canada’s aboriginal 
population: 25.6 per cent of those hospitalized were of Aboriginal ancestry, 
although they comprise only 4 per cent of the Canadian population.85 During the 
influenza pandemic of 1918-1919 the death rate among Aboriginal peoples was 
82. See Roach, supra note 55; David M Paciocco, “Constitutional Casualties of September 11: 
Limiting the Legacy of The Anti-Terrorism Act” (2002) 16 Sup Ct L Rev (2d) 185; Patrick J 
Smith, “Anti-Terrorism and Rights in Canada: Policy Discourse on the ‘Delicate Balance’” 
(2003) 25:2 Arab Studies Quarterly 137.
83. Harvey Kayman and Angela Ablorh-Odjidja note that in the “absence of social, political, and 
economic equality, racial and ethnic minorities and individuals of low socioeconomic status 
are left extremely vulnerable to every threat that may become apparent.” Harvey Kayman & 
Angela Ablorh-Odjidja “Revisiting Public Health Preparedness: Incorporating Social Justice 
Principles In Pandemic Preparedness Planning for Influenza” (2006) 12:4 J Pub Health 
Mgmt & Prac 373 at 376.
84. Lancet, supra note 1.
85. Donna Atkinson, “Health Inequities in First Nations Communities and Canada’s Response 
to the H1N1 Influenza Pandemic” in Joint Centre for Bioethics, Population and Public 
Health Ethics: Cases from Research, Policy, and Practice (Toronto: Canadian Institute for 
Health Research, 2012); Kevin Patterson, “Influenza has a cure: affluence” Globe and 
Mail (4 September 2009), online: http://www.theglobeandmail.com/technology/science/
influenza-has-a-cure-affluence/article4195391/> (documenting the impact of epidemics 
(including H1N1) on Canada’s First Nations communities and concluding that “the main 
reason native people die of infections, at rates that would be inconceivable and entirely 
unacceptable to other Canadians, is because they are poor”).
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five times that of the non-Aboriginal population.86 In the aftermath of Hurricane 
Katrina in 2005, it was clear that income differentials, which in New Orleans 
were heavily correlated with race, led to significantly disparate outcomes.87 It is 
worth underscoring that these burdens include not only death but also serious 
illness, depletion of resources, forced separation, restrictions on movement, 
and stigmatization.
These disparate outcomes can be traced to the social processes that construct 
disadvantage, marginalization, and exclusion.88 They are shaped, as Tierney 
suggests, by the “same dimensions of stratification and inequality that influence 
people’s lives during non-disaster times,” such as wealth, poverty, age, race, 
ethnicity, gender, and disability.89 Inadequate shelter and income, illiteracy, poor 
health, food insecurity, and political marginalization all contribute to social 
vulnerability. These factors, in turn, are connected to larger social and economic 
structures and processes—for example, the lack of affordable housing, the 
declining value of the minimum wage, the growth in precarious work, growing 
income inequality, and discrimination.
Linking the differential impact of pandemics to patterns of systemic and 
structural inequality repositions pandemics as problems not of national security 
but of social injustice. Here, scholarship that frames public health generally as a 
matter of social justice, and that calls for ethical frameworks that would displace 
the primacy of individual autonomy, help to flesh out an alternative approach 
to pandemic preparation.90 The identification of social determinants of health 
has been central to the framing of public health as a matter of social justice. 
This approach challenges the narrow framing of the dominant bio-medical view 
86. Thomas Appleyard, Bridging the preparedness divide: A framework for health equity in Ontario’s 
Emergency Management Programs (Toronto: Wellesley Institute, 2009) at 9, online: < http://
www.homelesshub.ca/sites/default/files/ori5qc0m.pdf>.
87. See Jonathan Purtle, “Racial and Ethnic Disparities in Post-Disaster Mental Health: 
Examining the Evidence through a Lens of Social Justice” (2012) 19:1 Wash & Lee J CR & 
Soc Just 31; Kayman & Ablorh-Odjidja, supra note 83.
88. See Canadian Red Cross, “Integrating Emergency Management and High-Risk Populations: 
Survey Report and Action Recommendations” (19 December 2007) at 10-13, online <http://
www.redcross.ca/cmslib/general/dm_high_risk_populations.pdf >. See also AM Viens, 
“Disadvantage, Social Justice and Paternalism” (2013) 6:1 Public Health Ethics 28.
89. Kathleen Tierney, “Social Inequality, Hazards, and Disasters” in Roland J Daniels, Donald 
F Kettl & Howard Kunreuther, eds, On Risk and Disaster: Lessons from Hurricane Katrina 
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2006) 109 at 110.
90. See the literature on social justice approaches to public health, for example Kayman & 
Ablorh-Odjidja, supra note 83; Purtle, supra note 87; Lawrence O Gostin & Madison 
Powers, “What Does Social Justice Require for the Public’s Health? Public Health Ethics And 
Policy Imperatives” (2006) 25:4 Health Affairs 1053.
(2014) 51 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL944
by underscoring the importance of access to adequate housing, income, food 
security, and social networks, along with the absence of discrimination and 
social exclusion, in maintaining health.91 Cast as a “health equity” approach, it 
seeks to redress “differences in health outcomes that are avoidable, unfair and 
systematically related to social inequality and disadvantage.”92 Significant here is 
the shift from the physical body and medical expertise as the loci of health, to the 
impact on health of the social, economic, and political context.
The dominant approach to ethics in health care is principlism. Grounded 
in the clinical relationship between doctor and patient, and rooted in liberal 
individualism, this approach emphasizes respect for autonomy, beneficence, 
non-maleficence, and justice as its guiding ethical values.93 Principlism’s focus 
upon the individual and its prioritization of autonomy lead, not surprisingly, to 
identification of the potential infringement of privacy, liberty, and security of the 
person through quarantine, isolation, and forced treatment as one of the pressing 
ethical issues posed by pandemic planning. In their critique of principlism, 
Baylis, Kenny, and Sherwin advance a particularly insightful conceptualization 
of relational autonomy and social justice.94 Liberal conceptions of autonomy 
presuppose persons as self-made and self-governing. Relational autonomy, 
by contrast, understands persons to be constituted by and through social 
relations, and their ability to self-govern to be shaped by social structures. Social 
position or location—race, gender, socio-economic status, immigration status, 
for example—places people differently in their access to and ability to benefit 
from social structures and resources. This interface reflects and reinforces the 
distribution of social disadvantage and privilege, including access to health and 
well-being. As such, our framework of public health ethics needs to be expanded 
beyond the doctor-patient relationship to take into account the manner in which 
social structures, systems and policies create options and the means to secure 
health for some, but not others.
As Baylis, Kenny, and Sherwin suggest, this approach to public health moves 
beyond a conception of distributive justice as the fair distribution of benefits and 
91. See Juha Mikkonen and Dennis Raphael, Social Determinants of Health: The Canadian Facts 
(Toronto: York University School of Health Policy and Management, 2010) online: <http://
www.thecanadianfacts.org/>.
92. Appleyard, supra note 86 at 3.
93. Francoise Baylis, Nuala P Kenny & Susan Sherwin, “A Relational Account of Public Health 
Ethics” (2008) 1:3 Public Health Ethics 196; Cara M Cheyette, “Communitarianism and 
the Ethics of Communicable Disease: Some Preliminary Thoughts” (2011) 39:4 JL Med & 
Ethics 678.
94. Baylis, Kenny & Sherwin, supra note 93.
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burdens, to a conception of social justice. Social justice, in contrast to distributive 
justice, draws attention to how membership in social groups creates disadvantage. 
It stretches the conceptualization of benefits and burdens to include not only 
material resources but also participation, power, and self-respect. This offers, in 
turn, an alternative framework for the conceptualization of pandemic planning.
A. VOICE AND PARTICIPATION
The political exclusion of marginalized social groups has meant that their distinct 
circumstances and needs have been largely invisible within pandemic and other 
disaster management plans. Of the 37 national pandemic plans (including 
Canada’s) reviewed by Uscher-Pines et al, only ten plans identified groups whose 
members might be socially disadvantaged or have special needs, and not a single 
plan systematically identified and addressed the needs of disadvantaged groups. 
Only one plan identified a need for temporary housing for disadvantaged groups, 
and discussion of the impact of social distancing measures such as school closures 
on families dependent upon the food their children receive at school were rarely 
identified. None mentioned the broader issue of the need to ensure access to 
food and water or addressed the disproportionate impact of the loss of income 
on those who are already socially disadvantaged.95
Based on surveys of voluntary and emergency management organizations, 
the Canadian Red Cross concluded that significant gaps exist in emergency 
management plans at the federal, provincial, and territorial levels in addressing 
the needs of marginalized populations, with the needs of women, transient 
populations, and new immigrants/cultural minorities the least likely to be 
considered.96 Importantly, workers in the voluntary sector expressed little 
confidence that the needs of such populations would be addressed during 
a disaster.97 A 2010 Canadian survey of public health staff regarding the 
responsiveness of plans to “marginalized urban populations” came to a similar 
conclusion: community groups have not been engaged early enough in planning 
and as a result, plans are too generic in nature, with inadequate attention to 
95. Lori Uscher-Pines et al, “Planning for an Influenza Pandemic: Social Justice and 
Disadvantaged Groups” (2007) 37:4 Hastings Center Report 32 at 35-36.
96. Canadian Red Cross, supra note 88 at 30.
97. Ibid at 41.
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the needs of marginalized groups.98 Street nurse Cathy Crowe captures the 
consequences for the homeless of these gaps within pandemic plans:
When SARS hit Toronto it was evident within weeks that shelters and drop-ins and 
all the people in them would have to fend for themselves. The City’s best plan in the 
event that homeless people were exposed to SARS included a proposed ‘lockdown’ 
of Seaton House—the largest men’s shelter in Canada—and ‘home’ quarantine in 
the same shelter. No plans for proper quarantine facilities. No plans for drop-in 
centres. No plans to stop the night-by-night movement of people who are homeless 
and forced to use the volunteer based Out of the Cold emergency shelter sector. This 
lack of planning would have made it impossible to contain the outbreak should 
SARS have entered this population.99
Redressing the invisibility of the distinct needs of marginalized groups 
and the often misplaced assumptions underlying existing plans requires the 
active participation and collaboration of marginalized groups in the planning 
process.100 Collaboration is essential to the creation of plans that move beyond 
an undifferentiated ‘public,’ that are attentive to the distinct needs, expectations 
and perceptions of marginalized groups, and that ensure “equal protection and 
98. International Centre for Infectious Disease, Issues in Pandemic Influenza Responses for 
Marginalized Urban Populations: Key Findings for Marginalized Urban Populations (March 
2010) online: <http://www.icid.com/files/Marg_Pop_Influenza/Issues_in_Pandemic_
Influenza_Responses_for_Marginalized_Ubran_Populations_English_FINAL.pdf>. The 
survey was sent to 288 public health staff and 96 responses were received. Massey et al 
similarly conclude that the comprehensive plans developed by most countries neglect 
the needs of marginalized populations. In particular, they note the failure to include the 
Indigenous people of Australian in a respectful partnership. While the Australian plan 
recognizes the increased risk for Indigenous people, it does not adequately attend to the 
specific context of their lives, including profound social inequality, poor access to health 
care, and institutionalized racism. They urge a respectful and genuine partnership, grounded 
in respect for human rights, and they warn that “the consequences of inflexibly enforcing a 
non-Indigenous model of containment will be dire.” PD Massey et al, “Pandemic influenza 
containment and the cultural and social context of Indigenous communities” (2009) 9 Rural 
and Remote Health 1179.
99. Canadian Red Cross, supra note 88 at 15 [emphasis in original]. As SARS unfolded in 
Toronto, the city struggled to find a quarantine site for homeless people, eventually settling 
on one floor of an existing shelter. Leung et al report that efforts were “hampered by the 
limited availability of suitable facilities and concerns regarding negative reactions from the 
community near such a facility” (supra note 8 at 408).
100. The central importance of community engagement, and in particular of disadvantaged 
communities is advocated by, for example, the American Civil Liberties Union (Annas, 
Mariner & Parmet, Public Health, supra note 5) and the Canadian Red Cross (supra note 88). 
See also George L Saunders & Thea Monet, “Eliminating Injustice Toward Disadvantaged 
Populations During an Influenza Pandemic” (2007) 68:1 North Carolina Medical J 46.
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quality of services during a pandemic … regardless of social difference.”101 Such 
engagement also enables those involved in the planning process to understand 
and consider local knowledge, skills, and networks, all of which will be critical 
in a pandemic.102
The Bellagio Principles, derived during a meeting of public health 
practitioners to discuss social justice and pandemics, echo this imperative.103 
These principles would require explicit identification of disadvantaged groups, 
their engagement in the planning process, identification of the distinct needs of 
diverse disadvantaged groups in the context of a pandemic, and concrete plans 
to meet those needs.
Engaged conversation and collaboration in pandemic planning are also 
vehicles for building trust. Many of those who experience profound social 
marginalization have experienced repeated betrayals of trust, including by state 
actors. They have little reason to trust that the state will act in their interest. This 
distrust will, of course, not be mended through a few conversations. Rather, it 
requires ongoing and sustained opportunities for those who experience social 
vulnerability to participate, not only in conversations about pandemic planning, 
but in a vast array of areas of legal and social regulation.
B. RECALIBRATING THE RESPONSIBILITY MIX
Pandemic planning invariably entails decision-making regarding the allocation 
of responsibility for action not only between differing levels of government, but 
as between the state, community-based organizations, and individuals. As noted 
above in Part I.B, current pandemic plans allocate significant responsibility to 
individuals to be personally prepared and to voluntarily comply with the advice, 
directives, or orders of state agents; people are expected to stockpile food, shelter 
or quarantine themselves in their homes, and faithfully practice germ elimination 
methods.104 These expectations are premised upon a number of assumptions 
regarding the capacity of individuals, which as the Wellesley Institute concludes 
in relation to Canada’s federal plan and its campaign for personal preparedness, 
may be “unrealistic, unfair and inequitable.”105 Surveys and interviews conducted 
101. Kayman & Ablorh-Odjidja, supra note 83.
102. Canadian Red Cross, supra note 88 at 23.
103. Bellagio Meeting on Social Justice and Influenza, “Bellagio Statement of Principles” (2006), 
online: <http://www.unicef.org/avianflu/files/Bellagio_Statement.pdf>.
104. See note 58, above, for particulars of the expectations regarding personal preparedness.
105. Appleyard, supra note 86 at 13.
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with homeless individuals in Toronto after the H1N1 pandemic revealed just 
how unrealistic and unfair these expectations often are.
Between October 2010 and April 2011, 149 homeless individuals in Toronto 
completed a detailed survey and participated in a structured interview covering 
matters such as general health, access to shelter, food, and water, and the use of 
services, including emergency shelters for drop-ins. The interviews also included 
questions specifically focused upon the two waves of the H1N1 pandemic in the 
spring and fall of 2009, exploring such issues as access to reliable information, 
vaccines and health care.106 Among the sample, 64.4 per cent identified as 
male, 30.2 per cent as female, and 2.7 per cent as transgendered; 45 per cent 
were street-involved youth (age 24 and under), and 24.8 per cent identified as 
Aboriginal or First Nations. Ninety-six per cent of those in the sample reported 
being homeless during the H1N1 pandemic. The homeless individuals who 
participated in the study reported heavy reliance on shelters (59 per cent used 
shelters between once per month and most of the time, a percentage that rose 
to 62.4 per cent during the H1N1 pandemic) and drop-in centres to meet basic 
needs (48.3 per cent reported accessing these every day, 18.1 per cent more than 
twice per week, and 71.8 per cent during the H1N1 pandemic). Not only do 
they not have access to a private sphere over which they can exercise control, 
they are forced to survive within a homelessness infrastructure in which they 
frequently sleep and eat in over-crowded conditions (for example, 33.7 per cent 
reported in the survey sleeping in overcrowded conditions once a week or more 
often) and where constant mobility is necessary to meet basic needs (travelling 
to drop-ins, engaging in street-level subsistence activities, seeking protection 
from the elements).107 Social distancing measures designed to limit the spread 
of contagious disease are fundamentally at odds with the structures, institutions, 
and routines necessary to access food, shelter, and support. The ability to 
106. The survey and interviews were components of the two CIHR funded projects mentioned 
in the acknowledgements at the outset, Responding to H1N1 in the Context of Homelessness 
in Canada and Understanding Pandemic Preparedness within the Context of the Canadian 
Homelessness Crisis. In addition to the surveys and interviews with homeless individuals, 
service providers and key informants were also interviewed in four Canadian cities: 
Toronto, Regina, Calgary and Victoria. For the only published work from the projects 
focuses specifically on access to vaccines to date, see Kristy Buccieri & Stephen Gaetz, 
“Ethical Vaccine Distribution Planning for Pandemic Influenza: Prioritizing Homeless and 
Hard-to-Reach Populations” (2013) 6:2 Pub Health Ethics 185. The discussion in the text 
draws from a data analysis of the surveys and interviews of homeless individuals in Toronto 
prepared by Kristy Buccieri (on file with the author).
107. I draw here from the survey and interview data of the Toronto portion of the empirical 
research described at the outset of this article.
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practice recommended germ elimination methods—regular hand washing and 
disinfecting surfaces—is similarly constrained.
The concept of relational autonomy helps us to see that social structures 
and processes create limited, and in some circumstances virtually non-existent, 
options. Rather than blaming individuals for their ‘failure’ to self-protect, or to 
comply with public health orders, we need to consider what forms of state action 
are required to enable compliance. The Campbell Commission provides insight 
into possibilities of this sort. After a lengthy review of quarantine measures, 
including compliance data, the Commission recommended legislative reforms 
that would provide a range of employment protections and a “basic blueprint 
for the most predictable types of compensation” that would be provided.108 The 
importance of enabling compliance was borne out during the H1N1 pandemic 
in the United States, where a major determinant of compliance with social 
distancing measures was the presence of employer-paid sick-leave.109
The Campbell Commission’s analysis also underscores the reciprocity 
that is essential to an effective pandemic response: governments cannot expect 
compliance with measures such as quarantine without a reciprocal obligation 
to ensure the provision of safe shelter and access to adequate food, water, and 
other necessities, and to provide job security and adequate compensation.110 
The Commission concludes that “[a]ny fight against infectious disease 
depends above all on public cooperation. … [which] must be nurtured and 
promoted,”111 adding that “legal powers by themselves are false hopes.”112 It 
continues: “Voluntary compliance is the bedrock of any emergency response. 
It is essential to compensate those who suffer an unfair burden of personal cost 
for cooperating in public health measures like quarantine.”113 Further, “without 
108. Campbell Commission, supra note 17 at 9.
109. Purtle, supra note 87 at 42-43, where he also references one study estimating that “disparities 
in paid sick leave policies contributed to an additional 1.2 million cases of probably H1N1 
among Hispanics.”
110. Gostin & Berkman, supra note 1 at 174 also emphasize the ethical obligation of society to 
provide those affected with the necessities of life, including safe and humane housing, high 
quality medical care, and psychological support.
111. Campbell Commission, supra note 17 at 8.
112. Ibid at 11.
113. Ibid.
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public cooperation, laws are little help … . Legal procedures are useless without 
overwhelming public cooperation … .”114
But here again the advice of the Commission has been largely ignored. 
Ontario’s Employment Standards Act provides for a leave of absence, but the 
leave is unpaid.115 Moreover, eligibility arises only after an emergency has been 
declared and the employee has been made the subject of an order under the 
Emergency Management and Civil Protection Act116 or the HPPA, or is required 
to care for a close relative (as listed in the statute) who is the subject of such an 
order. This is woefully inadequate because it ignores the impact of lost income on 
low-wage earners and telescopes our obligation of care to a narrow circle of 
close relatives, omitting the friends, neighbours, and colleagues who may well 
require assistance in the time of a pandemic. Complete silence surrounds future 
compensation plans.
C. ACCESSING TRUSTED INFORMATION
Access to timely and relevant communication from a trusted source has been 
identified as absolutely critical by the Campbell Commission and by many others 
who think about pandemic planning. Gostin and Berkman have noted that while 
misinformation has been rampant during past pandemics, the most marginalized 
members of society have experienced the least access to credible and reliable 
sources of information.117 Differences in culture, language, reasoning processes, 
and literacy all point to the importance of tailored and targeted communications.118 
But unless those with varied needs participate in the planning and development 
114. Ibid at 298, 300. While here the Campbell Commission emphasized that compliance derives 
from a sense of civic duty rather than a fear of legal consequences, later in its report the 
Commission expresses a view that “[e]ducation and moral suasion ... will not bring results 
unless the people realize that behind them is the long arm of the Law” (ibid at 298).
115. SO 2000, c 41, s 50.1. In some instances, other forms of unpaid leave, such as the family 
medical leave (ibid, 49.1), the family caregiver leave (ibid, 49.3) and the personal emergency 
leave (ibid, 50(1)), may be available.
116. RSO 1990, c E-9.
117. Gostin & Berkman, supra note 1 at 162.
118. Elaine Vaughan & Timothy Tinker, “Effective Health Risk Communication About 
Pandemic Influenza for Vulnerable Populations” (2009) 99 Am J Pub Health 324. 
Here again, the experience of the Ebola virus in West Africa is instructive; not only has 
the absence of trust in state actors presented a major barrier to containing its spread, 
but so too has the failure to consider cultural practices in burying the dead (in which 
the deceased’s body is touched). See Arinjay Banerjee et al, “Vulnerability, hysteria 
and fear – conquering Ebola virus” (2014) 201:6 Med J Aus 320 at 320-21; Celine 
Gounder, “To combat Ebola, first build back trust in healthcare workers” The Great 
Debate (30 July 2014), online: < http://blogs.reuters.com/great-debate/2014/07/30/
efforts-against-ebola-outbreak-hampered-by-victims-lack-of-trust-in-healthcare-workers/>.
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of the content of communications and communication strategies, a nuanced 
appreciation of those differences will not emerge, and communications during 
a pandemic will be massively uneven, with potentially devastating implications.
Additionally, the importance of a trusted source of information cannot be 
under-estimated. Indeed the Campbell Commission identified public confidence 
that medical decisions are being made by a trusted independent medical leader 
as “the most important thing in a public health emergency.”119 But do we know 
whom different populations rely upon and trust for information? The Toronto 
study of homeless individuals specifically asked about who they trusted to provide 
public health information during the outbreak of H1N1. Health care providers 
were ranked as the source of the best information about H1N1, followed by the 
television, shelter and drop-in centre staff, posters and pamphlets, and family 
members. Community health clinics were the most common point of access 
to health care for those interviewed (36.9 per cent report using community 
health centres, while 30.9 per cent reported having a regular doctor, 24.8 per 
cent utilized walk-in clinics, and 22.8 per cent used the health services offered 
through shelters and drop-in centres). Gathering this type of more finely 
grained information is critical to developing responses that are attentive to the 
needs of particular groups, and ultimately to our ability to minimize the impact 
of a pandemic.
D. ACCESSING VACCINES
There is widespread agreement that in a pandemic there will be not be an adequate 
supply of vaccines or anti-viral medications, raising important questions about 
allocative criteria. Much of the literature here—medical and ethical—focuses 
on medical vulnerability and the importance of preserving the health of first 
responders and health care workers.120 Again, a shift in focus to a social justice 
model challenges these widely agreed-upon priorities.121 Viewed through the lens 
of social vulnerability, the issues of crowded living quarters, inadequate food, 
119. Campbell Commission, supra note 17 at 13 [emphasis added].
120. The Government of Canada identifies several priority groups (although they are not rank 
ordered); none of the groups are derived from a social vulnerability analysis. Public Health 
Agency of Canada, supra note 58.
121. Tracey O’Sullivan & Maxime Bourgoin, “Vulnerability in an Influenza Pandemic: 
Looking Beyond Medical Risk” (Ottawa: Public Health Agency of Canada, 2010), online: 
<http://cdn.metricmarketing.ca/www.icid.com/files/Marg_Pop_Influenza/Lit_Review_-_
Vulnerability_in_Pandemic_EN.pdf>. See also Hillary R Ahle, “Anticipating Pandemic Avian 
Influenza: Why the Federal and State Preparedness Plans are for the Birds” (2007) 10:2 De 
Paul J Health Care L 213.
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and poor ventilation become relevant to the determination of priority access. 
As the Toronto surveys and interviews reveal, homeless individuals experience 
significant social vulnerability: they report high levels of poor health (33.6 per 
cent described their overall health as fair, 7.4 per cent as poor/bad, and 3.4 per cent 
as very poor/bad). More particularly, 21.5 per cent reported chronic lung disease, 
58.75 per cent fatigue, 43.6 per cent depression, and 47.5 per cent a disability. 
This combination of poor health, inadequate nutrition, overcrowding, and, in 
many shelters, poor ventilation, renders the homeless particularly vulnerable to 
the acquisition of communicable disease. While a medical lens of vulnerability 
may identify some of the homeless for priority access, a consideration of social 
vulnerability would shift significantly more resources towards the homeless 
population.122
A consideration of social vulnerability not only expands the range of ethical 
considerations necessary to deliberations about prioritization but also requires 
that we consider the more pragmatic logistical challenges of ensuring access to 
vaccines for marginalized groups. During the H1N1 pandemic, for example, a 
concerted effort to create accessible, community-based vaccination clinics for the 
homeless was undertaken through a partnership between Toronto Public Health 
and shelters, drop-in centres, and community-based health centres. This effort 
resulted in a sizeable increase in homeless people’s vaccination rates for H1N1 
compared to seasonal flu, from an average of 25 per cent for the seasonal flu 
vaccine to 38 per cent for the H1N1 vaccine as reported by participants in the 
Toronto study (a rate similar to that of the general population).123 
122. Gostin & Berkman note that the criteria frequently employed to determine access 
prioritization protect relatively high-income earners—those who produce vaccines, 
first responders, medical personnel—and utterly fail to attend to those who are socially 
disadvantaged (Gostin & Berkman, supra note 1 at 136-39). There are profoundly important 
issues related to the global access to vaccines and anti-virals; for example, during the 2009 
H1N1 pandemic, developed countries bought virtually all the vaccines that companies 
could manufacture. See David P Fidler, “Negotiating Equitable Access to Influenza Vaccines: 
Global Health Diplomacy and the Controversies Surrounding Avian Influenza H5N1 
and Pandemic Influenza H1N1” (2010) 7:5 PLOS Medicine 1, online: <http://www.
plosmedicine.org/article/info%3Adoi%2F10.1371%2Fjournal.pmed.1000247>. See also 
Buccieri & Gaetz, supra note 106; Mark A Rothstein, “Should Health Care Providers Get 
Treatment Priority in an Influenza Pandemic?” (2010) 38:2 JL Med & Ethics 412; Carl H 
Coleman, “Allocating Vaccines and Antiviral Medications During an Influenza Pandemic” 
(2009) 39:4 Seton Hall L Rev 1111.
123. Buccieri & Gaetz, supra note 106 at 191.
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E. PREVENTING DISCRIMINATION
Stereotypes of the poor, the homeless, Aboriginal people, racialized peoples, 
and people with disabilities are pervasive and contribute to the discrimination 
that limits access to meaningful employment, to education, and to political 
participation. As noted above, there is considerable evidence from past pandemics 
and other disasters that these events exacerbate discrimination.124 Particular 
groups have been identified as sources of contagion, scapegoated, demeaned, and 
disrespected. Pandemic planning informed by social justice requires, as Keil and 
Ali have argued, planning how to avoid the “identification of infection with race, 
ethnicity or other socio-physical appearance,” and to develop “safeguards against 
racist victimization of infected people and those who are targeted as potential 
risk groups.”125 As the Campbell Commission cautioned regarding orders 
against a class of persons, it is “all too easy for officials with lesser sensitivity to 
act immediately, without consultation, and to think only later of the ensuing 
stigmatization, disruption, and confrontation.”126
124. Selgelid reminds us that “infectious diseases are prone to promote fear, panic, stigma, 
discrimination, and emotional and irrational decision and policy making” (supra note 10 at 
255).
125. Roger Keil & Harris Ali, “Multiculturalism, Racism and Infectious Disease in the Global 
City: The Experience of the 2003 SARS Outbreak in Toronto” 16 Topia 23 at 25. Similarly 
the American Civil Liberties Union suggests that a governing principle must be the 
protection of minorities and the socially disadvantaged from discrimination (Annas, Mariner 
& Parmet, Public Health, supra note 5). Gostin & Berkman similarly address concerns 
regarding the discriminatory use of social distancing, quarantine, and isolation (supra note 1).
126. Campbell Commission, supra note 17 at 320-21. To guard against this, the Commission 
recommended that “the power to order and enforce isolation of a group must, wherever 
practicable, be preceded by such degree of consultation with the group as is feasible in the 
circumstances” (ibid at 321).
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III. CONCLUSION
The evidence to date suggests that the voices of those who are socially marginalized, 
including the homeless, have been largely silenced in the pandemic planning 
process. They have not been identified as requiring priority access to treatment 
or vaccinations, notwithstanding their vulnerability to communicable diseases, 
their need to travel to access basic necessities, and their lack of access to resources 
required to take measures to protect themselves. The recommendations of the 
Campbell Commission regarding the obligations of the state to guarantee safe 
shelter, food, and water, and to be absolutely clear about available compensation, 
have been ignored. Social vulnerability finds no place in the national security 
narrative that reduces individuals to risks, dehumanizing them in the process.
Against the dominant narrative of national security, the social justice 
approach to planning struggles for a place. There are, however, signs of change. 
There is a growth in scholarship that engages social justice in public health 
generally, and in pandemic planning more specifically. O’Sullivan and Bourgoin, 
in a recent review of the pandemic literature, discern a shift from a focus on 
medical vulnerability to social vulnerability.127 Ontario’s Pandemic Influenza Plan 
for the Health Sector has recently been updated to incorporate “health equity” 
as a defining principle, promising a strategy that “strives to reduce or eliminate 
socially structured differentials in health outcomes, building on broader ideas 
about fairness, social justice and civil society,” and noting that:
For example, the implementation of system-wide school closures has different 
impacts on groups in society such as single parents/caregivers, children who 
participate in school-based nutrition programs, families with low or fixed incomes 
who cannot afford increased child care costs, and parents who do not have flexible 
work arrangements, paid vacation or short term leave policies.128
Equity principles have not, however, moved into action and there are 
worrying trends in the opposite direction.
Income inequality continues to grow in Canada. The Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) ranks Canada as one 
of the developed countries with the worst income gap.129 After close to three 
127. O’Sullivan & Bourgoin, supra note 121.
128. Ministry of Health and Long-Term Care, “Ontario Health Plan for an Influenza Pandemic” 
(2013) at 8, online: <http://www.health.gov.on.ca/en/pro/programs/emb/pan_flu/docs/
ch_04.pdf>.
129. Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development, “Divided We Stand: Why 
Inequality Keeps Rising” (2011), online: <http://www.oecd.org/canada/49177689.pdf>.
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decades of neo-liberal reforms, Banting and Myles describe Canada as a “fading 
redistributive state” wherein the tax transfer system no longer offsets the growth 
in inequality generated by the market, and where ideational shifts have replaced 
equality with efficiency.130 In this context of growing inequality, how ought we to 
think about legal preparedness?
As former Chief Justice Roy McMurtry urged in the context of anti-terrorism 
measures, no doubt there is a role for law and for lawyers to “uphold the rights 
of the individual in the face of increased security concerns.”131 As outlined above, 
a number of obstacles impede access to an adjudicative forum to review orders 
made under the HPPA, and procedural reforms would go at least some distance 
in protecting the rights of individuals to liberty, privacy, and security of the 
person in the context of a pandemic. But that distance, in light of the power of 
the national security narrative, will be very short indeed.
Beyond these measures there is a role for law and lawyers in advancing 
the social justice approach to pandemic planning. Here the emphasis is upon 
creating positive state obligations, rather than keeping the state out of the lives of 
its subjects. Such obligations range from those tied to an actual pandemic—the 
creation of enforceable employment protections, guaranteed compensation 
packages, the right to safe quarantine or isolation facilities and to food and 
water—to more expansive and longer-term measures designed to diminish social 
inequality. Securing a right to health—not to health care but to health with all 
that entails in relation to its social determinants—will be our best protection 
against a pandemic. As legal professionals, our efforts cannot be confined to the 
contestation of particular and specific deployments of state power to detain, 
contain, and treat. In isolating justice concerns to this narrow band of activity, 
the social and participatory domains of justice are ignored.
Baylis, Kenny and Sherwin suggest that the threat of a pandemic has created 
a “window of opportunity” to think creatively about “an ethics framework 
that is firmly grounded in our common interest in preventing illness, building 
physically and socially healthy communities and eliminating health inequities.”132 
Perhaps equally so, it presents an opportunity for us to rethink the necessary 
legal framework, one constructed with the full participation of those traditionally 
excluded and marginalized.
130. Keith Banting & John Myles, Inequality and the Fading of Redistributive Politics (Vancouver, 
BC: UBC Press, 2013).
131. Toope, supra note 4 at 295.
132. Baylis, Kenny & Sherwin, supra note 93 at 196.

